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MEMORANDUM

SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEFECTS
IMPOSING QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RES-
TRICCTIONS ON THE OUTPUT OF INTELLIGENCE
MATERIAL IN OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THEIR CORRECTION

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INTRODUCTION

The deterioration of morale which has been progressive for some time in the leading Regional Branches of the Office of Reports and Estimates has now reached a point at which it can be said that the mission of the Central Intelligence Group is seriously threatened. This problem is considered herein from the viewpoint of the Western Europe Branch. There is reason to believe, however, that the conclusions reached in this study are shared by the chiefs of other Branches.

Examination of the conditions in the Office of Reports and Estimates, long experience in intelligence work and sound theory indicate that the so-called Intelligence Staff, by reason of its position within the organization and the manner in which it has exercised its authority, precludes the development of sound, expert and timely high-level studies such as the Central Intelligence Group was created to produce in the interests of national security. This situation has come about because the Intelligence Staff, through which all studies must pass before they reach higher echelon, has been permitted to come into being and to enlarge its function to include: (a) distortion of the considered opinions expressed in official documents by the experts of the Regional Branches; (b) the ordering of studies to be prepared by such experts; (c) the issuing of orders affecting the operation of the Branches in ignorance of their administrative problems and of sound intelligence procedures. Not only has the output of the Branches been impeded and mishandled by the Intelligence Staff, but it may soon be impossible to retain desirable and highly trained personnel in the Regional Branches.

It is concluded, in the best interest of the service, that the Intelligence Staff should be disbanded at once and that its duties should be reallocated as set forth in the final section of this paper.

The data and arguments leading to these conclusions will be presented under the following general headings:

- (a) Discussion of relevant intelligence theory.
- (b) Discussion of the origin of the Intelligence Staff in the Office of Reports and Estimates, and its place in the organization.
- (c) Manner and method by which the Intelligence Staff exerts its authority.
- (d) Conclusions as to the usefulness of the Intelligence Staff.
- (e) Recommendations.

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(a) Discussion of relevant intelligence theory.

Sound intelligence theory and practice require that intelligence should pass directly from the experts* who produce it to "those who need to know."

This proposition is based on the obvious good sense inherent in the idea that the originating expert, because of his background, abilities and specialization must be relied on for the production of incisive intelligence. To interpose between the expert and "those who need to know" a group of men who can spend but little of their time in studying the subject matter, and to invest them with the power of censoring, changing or suppressing the conclusions, as well as the diction and method of presentation is to stultify the product of any intelligence organization both as to quality and timeliness.

A second and highly dangerous condition flows from this type of hierarchical organization and function in that it creates working conditions which are intolerable to a self-respecting expert. This situation becomes unendurable to informed men if arguments and criticisms are expressed by individuals who possess authority but lack expert knowledge, and if moreover they adopt the manners of testy college professors correcting freshmen compositions. Under such conditions the retention of highly competent men is always in question; the teamwork that is to be found in a well-matured intelligence organization cannot be realized.

* The word "expert" is used in this study to represent the collective effort of a regional branch or branches operating on a specific subject. This involves the (a) man (or men) assigned to a specific area or subject, (b) editorial assistance furnished within the group, (c) guidance and final approval of the responsible branch head or heads.

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- (b) Discussion of the origin of the Intelligence Staff in the Office of Reports and Estimates and its place in the organization.

The creation of the Intelligence Staff in the Office of Reports and Estimates was a violation of the sound intelligence theory set forth under (a) above. Moreover, the subsequent operations of the Staff have tended to make this violation so extensive as to threaten, in a most serious way, the production of intelligence studies by the Central Intelligence Group.

In order to understand how the situation came about, it is necessary to glance at the intelligence setup in Washington during the late war. Recognizing the weaknesses of the older intelligence services, President Roosevelt had established the Office of Strategic Services for the purpose of gathering together men of exceptional background and ability who could operate in the field of national intelligence outside the formulas of military procedure. Whatever the merits of the Office of Strategic Services (in estimating them it would be necessary to give due weight to the difficulties of the time and the opposition of the older services which felt themselves to be threatened by this new arrival) it marked a crucial point in the development of US intelligence. It is obvious that the Central Intelligence Group exists in recognition of the needs that prompted the creation of the Office of Strategic Services.

The older military intelligence services, while recognizing (a) their own limitations and (b) the global, total character of the coming war, felt, quite correctly, that neither the civilian intelligence agencies (the Office of Strategic Services, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the State Department) nor the individual services, would be likely to produce studies that would be written expertly for joint military use. As a result of this apprehension there was created under the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a working group that was known as the Joint Intelligence Staff. It was the duty of

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the Joint Intelligence Staff to prepare studies for the Joint Intelligence Committee. The Staff was a board of writer-editors. The senior team of the Joint Intelligence Staff, employed largely in liaison work, was composed for the most part of Colonels, USA, and Captains, USN, some of whom had had little intelligence experience before the war. There was also a junior team composed largely of reserve officers of the Army and Navy, and representatives of one or more of the civilian agencies. Few of this latter group had had any intelligence experience prior to assignment. Both the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Intelligence Staff were dominated by military personnel.

It is highly important to note that the Joint Intelligence Staff was wholly dependent on outside sources for its intelligence information. The material that went into its studies was drawn from our Allies and from the US military and civilian intelligence agencies. The Joint Intelligence Staff did^{not}/have staffs of experts within its own ranks such as compose the regional and technical branches of the Office of Reports and Estimates. The Joint Intelligence Staff was in this sense an isolated and makeshift device established to meet an emergency. There is no functional parallel in the Office of Reports and Estimates to the position of the Joint Intelligence Staff save at the level of the regional desks and there only insofar and as long as these desks are dependent on the older services for intelligence information.

That an organization characterized as the "Intelligence Staff" should be set up in the Office of Reports and Estimates is rather remarkable if only for the implied reflection on the function and role of those who are in fact producing intelligence. It will be observed, however, that this Staff is composed in part of men who had been in the Joint Intelligence Staff;

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apparently they were able to impose their old title and a part of their former function on the Central Intelligence Group despite the incongruity of their doing so.

The creation of this Staff or branch of the Office of Reports and Estimates was questioned in a meeting held at the time of its activation by those who foresaw the difficulties that would arise. It was explained at that meeting that the words "Intelligence Staff" meant "Editorial Staff", and that the duties assigned it would be curtailed as stated in the original directive. As will be shown, a reverse of this policy was followed so that today instead of the Staff being on the same echelon of authority with the Regional Branches, as it seems to be on the organization chart, it, in fact, lies between them and the Office of the Assistant Director. This situation has gravely compromised the relations of the Branch Chiefs with the Assistant Director in that he appears very frequently to have prejudged matters on the basis of advice furnished him by the Intelligence Staff. The Branch Chiefs, conscious that their information and views relating to their own problems cannot be fully appreciated by the Intelligence Staff, leave such interviews with a sense of frustration and futility.

That the work of the Staff has by no means been held to the task of simple editing is further shown by the recent creation within it of a Projects Division. This is not a producing organization but appears, in its contacts with the Regional Branches, to have the power of originating studies and assigning work on them to the regional desks, a task that should be within the province of the desks themselves. The Staff appears also to exercise the purely administrative task of liaison with the [REDACTED] of the Contacts Branch, Office of Operations, activation of which was announced in a directive signed by the Chief of the Intelligence Staff.

* It has been said that the term "Intelligence Staff" was adopted in part as a means of evading the Civil Service regulations which do not permit editors to advance into the higher pay brackets.

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(c) Manner and method in which the Intelligence Staff
exerts its authority.

One of the chief ways in which the Intelligence Staff has sought to exert authority beyond the level of simple editing and editorial coordination is seen in connection with its work on Office of Reports and Estimates studies. One such study, dealing with Post-Occupation Italian Politics, was completed in the Western Europe Branch on January 6, 1947, and forwarded to the Intelligence Staff. Premier De Gasperi was at that time in Washington, and it was thought in the Branch that the paper might be timely and useful to policy makers.

Several days after the paper was submitted, the Chief of the Intelligence Staff asked the head of the Western Europe Branch to come to his office for a conference on the paper. At that meeting, the Chief made repeated efforts to reorient the opinion of the Italian expert and the head of the originating Branch in respect to his (the Chief's) personal opinion that the Christian Democratic Party might possess substantial, and even controlling, power after the next national elections. Since the paper very clearly indicated, both in the initial summary and through its text, that this was not the case, there could be no question of ambiguity, nor was this issue raised. The Chief made very direct and stubborn efforts, however, to alter the conclusions expressed, after due consideration by the Branch, particularly its opinion that the Church would probably support the Common Man Front.* He also expressed surprise and uneasiness

* The soundness of the political analysis made by the Italian desk and the timeliness and accuracy of its forecast were strikingly corroborated by the following comment from US Embassy Rome which reached Office of Reports and Estimates on

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that the paper should take a position that was more definite in its forecast than the position held by any other Washington department.

It might be pointed out that the preparation of this paper within the Branch had been continuous since the first week of December; that the expert, who is of an Italian family, who took his doctorate in Italian history and literature, who has travelled extensively in Italy, and who served as a US intelligence officer in Italy during the late war, called on all the Italian experts who are his opposite numbers in the US intelligence services in Washington and cleared with them the facts presented in this Office of Reports and Estimates study. The manuscript was then passed for editorial revision to a member of the Western Europe Branch who served in the Office of Naval Intelligence from 1941 to 1946 as head of the Special Publications Branch and who, at the same time, acted as an intelligence editor for the Joint Intelligence Committee. After extensive revisions, the paper went to the chief of the Western Europe Branch who made further suggestions.

In this paper a very serious effort was made to comply with the wish of the Director of Central Intelligence that such studies be as much forecasts as possible, that high points be stressed, and that argument and supporting data be held to a minimum. Further, to save reading time, a Summary was placed at the top of page one.

During the conference with the Chief of the Intelligence Staff, certain minor changes were agreed upon with the further understanding that when these had been made the paper would be released for distribution. The required textual changes were completed and the paper returned to the Intelligence Staff for dissemination. On Monday, 20 January, however, the study was again returned to the Western Europe Branch with 30 new and for criticisms the most part, trivial/noted in the margins, and drastic recommendations as to organization of material, etc., set forth

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in a covering memorandum.

Since the time when the paper was first submitted and the present, the Prime Minister of Italy has visited Washington, collected a \$50,000,000 check against US occupation costs and a \$100,000,000 credit with the Eximbank, been entertained widely in New York, flown back to Italy, resigned the Premiership, formed a new cabinet and appointed an Ambassador plenipotentiary who, in turn, has signed the peace treaty. When this study will be released is an open question in view of the impossibility of complying intelligently with the comments made by the Intelligence Staff.

One of the most important aspects of the type of editing engaged in by the Intelligence Staff is that it has, on more than one occasion, effected severe mutilations, if not complete destruction, of carefully worked-out forecasts. The following two examples will, perhaps, suffice to illustrate this statement.

An Office of Reports and Estimates study of Communist capabilities to seize political power in France was released to the Intelligence Staff by the Western Europe Branch on 22 November. Complying with the Director's request that the Central Intelligence Group express its own independent opinion on information received from other Departments of the Government, the original draft of 25X6 memorandum began as follows:

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On 14 November 1946, Central Intelligence Group (1) agrees that the Communists do not at present desire to seize control of the French government by force; (2) feels that the unqualified belief that the French Communists could seize control of the government at any time over-emphasizes certain factors, and that consideration of all available data raises strong doubts that a French Communist coup would be successful, although such an attempted coup would undoubtedly create serious confusion. To support this latter view the following four points are submitted: *****".

The Intelligence Staff rewrote this paper and reversed the opinion expressed by the Western Europe Branch by yielding to the State Department views on this matter. The Intelligence Staff version begins:

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"In discounting the possibility that a French Government could be formed excluding the Communists, Ambassador Caffery asserts that the Communists now have sufficient strength to seize power in France whenever they may deem it desirable to do so". The version continues with paraphrases of Ambassador Caffery's position and the balance of this study does not suggest, except in the most ambiguous and shadowy terms, the clearly expressed opinions of the Western Europe Branch.

This alternative draft was submitted to the Western Europe Branch which made its comment on 25 November, urging that the Western Europe Branch version be published for the following reasons: "(1) the estimate made is clear-cut and unequivocal; (2) the findings are less 'diluted' as a result of attempts to placate the State Department; (3) the estimate is made on the basis of the facts that are available to this branch, and without subservience to the personal views held by superior authority". The memorandum further stated, "In the event that [REDACTED] draft is preferred, it is recommended that it be made clear that: (1) the number of FFI officers remaining in the French Army is small relative to the officer corps as a whole, but not necessarily in relation to the total number of FFI officers who applied for commissions. It should also be noted that not all FFI officers are pro-Communist; (2) underground organizations are probably under the direction of Lt. General Revers, Chief of Staff of the Army, but do not 'exist underground in association with the Army', although these organizations probably have liaisons with 'certain parties, notably the PRL'".

Despite these clearly expressed views and a conference with the Assistant Director, Office of Reports and Estimates, the Intelligence Staff version was issued as Special Evaluation No.3, 26 November 1946. It should be noted that ensuing events have done nothing to invalidate the position taken by the Western Europe Branch in its original draft.

Another example of the disregard by the Intelligence Staff of the significance of material presented for publication is contained in the following case history. On 22 January 1947 the Italian desk submitted to the Chief of the Western Europe Branch an article on "The Italian Cabinet Crisis". This article discussed a pertinent intelligence trend regarding developments following upon the resignation of Premier De Gasperi. The article was passed to the Intelligence Staff on 22 January.

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On the following day the arrival of new cables necessitated a slight revision in the text. This was done by the Italian desk. These additional facts did not alter, however, the forecast of the article: Gasperi will probably succeed in forming a new Government with fewer Leftist members.

When the Weekly Summary appeared on the 24th of January the Italian article was missing. Neither the Italian desk nor the head of Western Europe Branch had been notified of its exclusion by the editors. On Monday, 27 January, the Italian desk inquired of a member of the Intelligence Staff, who appears to be in charge of editing the Weekly, why the article had been omitted, in view of its timeliness. The man replied, that the Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Staff had decided that the article should not be used because the Italian Cabinet crisis had "not crystalized enough." (This remark raises the very interesting question as when it is appropriate to write an intelligence forecast - before, during, or after the event). At any rate the CBS "News of the World" reporter in a broadcast on 28 January from Rome (0800-0815 Washington time) said, "Premier De Gasperi will probably announce the formation of a new government with two fewer Leftist members tonight. This indicates a swing to the Right in the Government". De Gasperi finally formed a Cabinet on 2 February with Count Carlo Sforza, an independent moderate, as Foreign Minister in place of the Radical Socialist Nenni. Another independent moderate, Gasparotto was added thus giving the cabinet a less radical orientation.

Needless to say, events such as this are not only disheartening to men who are attempting to comply with the President's Directive, but result in an absolute negation of Central Intelligence Group aims and the explicit instructions of the Director at his weekly meetings.

The most serious difficulties encountered in the Western Europe Branch in respect to Intelligence Staff memoranda and directives arise from the fact that certain of them require types of work which the Branch is too understaffed to perform

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with a satisfactory degree of competence. These work loads have been promulgated without so much as consulting the Branch Chiefs. Notable in this type of directive is one dealing with a paper on the aims of the Allies in the occupied areas of Germany and the effects of their occupations. The resulting study is designed to furnish a competent guide to high echelon officials interested in the progress of the peace negotiations.

The one man available in this Branch for carrying out this directive was also charged with the duties of acting head of the German desk. The excess burden he already carries in this capacity is indicated in the progress report for January 1947 prepared by the Branch. The paper which he produced, although it is felt to be a good summary of prevailing conditions, reflects this limitation of time and manpower. Doubt as to whether the Central Intelligence Group should release this paper rests on the well-known fact that the State Department has devoted scores of personnel to just this problem for many months. The wisdom of the decision to have the Office of Reports and Estimates undertake this necessarily inadequate study, as well as the one on the Austrian occupation, is therefore open to question in that the final result can hardly hope to compete with the work of the State Department on the same subjects. Western Europe agreed to undertake the study only because of the consistent policy of the Branch to do its utmost to comply with all requests for its services.

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(d) Conclusions as to the usefulness of the Intelligence Staff.

"Tentative Organization and Functions of the Central Intelligence Group, 22 July 1946" states that the duties of the Regional Branches of the Office of Reports and Estimates include direct responsibility for the production of "digests, summaries, estimates, appreciations, and 'flashes' as may be required to appraise developments and trends throughout the world which may affect the national security of the United States". Nothing in this document contemplates the existence of the Intelligence Staff which, as long experience has demonstrated, drastically impedes and frequently absolutely prevents the execution of these duties.

A consideration of the problems involved in producing expert intelligence in the Office of Reports and Estimates must include constructive as well as destructive criticism. Broad principles of intelligence must be formulated and applied where suitable. In this connection, the following propositions are considered:

(a) The success or failure of an intelligence organization depends primarily on the capacity of its experts.

(b) These personnel must be assumed, until proven otherwise, to possess the background (in every sense), the current information, the talent and the will to produce intelligence forecasts which are timely and in other ways directly useful in both short and long-range operations of Government.

(c) Providing favorable working conditions for such personnel is the first duty of their seniors. Handling of such personnel is a problem for experts. Each analyst must be treated as an individual; tact and understanding are required in order that the self-esteem of the individual be maintained and maximum use be made of his professional abilities

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attention to the fact that the Central Intelligence Group should, so far as the Office of Reports and Estimates is concerned, adopt the sympathetic helpful attitude found in such successful research organizations as the Rockefeller Institute.

- (d) No function of intelligence routine touches experts more closely than the editing of their texts.

This does not involve a temperamental factor so much as the direct consciousness which such experts have of the great difficulty in choosing words giving the precise shading appropriate to a specific situation. Nevertheless, there are many experts who combine information with a high degree of perception yet have difficulty in organizing and expressing their ideas in such a way as to be clear to another person. It follows, from the editor's viewpoint, that the editing of intelligence reports perhaps presents the greatest editorial difficulty in the whole field of writing. It has been found that the editor must profess ignorance, that he must appear to serve the originating expert as a literary guinea pig, and at the same time he must win the expert's respect and cooperation by putting together in the expert's name, studies that fulfill the expert's highest hopes. The selection of personnel to serve in this editorial capacity must be considered with the greatest care, attention being given, not only to known professional experience in intelligence editing, but the personality of such editors as well.

In formulating the following recommendations we have not lost sight of the fact that the Intelligence Staff has performed some of the functions which are essential to the production of

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intelligence studies, whether current or long-range. These include in the final analysis (a) coordinating research, production, planning, etc., between the Office of the Assistant Director and between the branches themselves; (b) establishing and maintaining a terse, clear, interesting style in all reports, etc.; (c) exercising careful judgment as to clarity of expression; (d) using in respect to all manuscripts and personnel what has been called "brilliant commonsense".

The recommendations set forth below represent the considered opinion, not only of personnel in the Western Europe Branch but that of both heads and members of other Branches. This collective opinion is based upon the demonstrated lack of editorial ability, misinformation, and lack of knowledge, ignorance of basic principles of intelligence operation, and misconception of function which has too often characterized the work of the Intelligence Staff. As a result of these conditions not only the responsible branch heads have lost confidence in the personnel of the Intelligence Staff but what is perhaps equally important, the producing members of their staffs have come increasingly to feel that their efforts are largely futile when the final say over their work is committed to the hands of incompetent authority. Such conditions not only dampen the enthusiasm of the producing personnel, but eventually engender a sense of frustration which in turn will induce the resignation of highly qualified men who can be replaced only with the greatest difficulty. Moreover, the disheartening air of bafflement created by the modus operandi of the Intelligence Staff has reduced the productivity of responsible individuals.

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(e) Recommendations.

In view of the foregoing it is recommended that:

- (1) The Intelligence Staff be disbanded.
- (2) Personnel attached thereto be reassigned to duties which do not involve editorial or administrative responsibilities for the production of intelligence studies.*
- (3) The essential functions hitherto exercised by the Intelligence Staff should be reallocated as shown in the Chart on page 20.

Considerations surveyed before drafting the proposed organization chart on page 20 are set forth below:

1. The Chart recognizes not only the functional problems of the intelligence personnel but also the problems inherent in the position of Assistant Director, Office of Reports and Estimates, and his Deputy. The administrative and liaison duties of the Assistant Director render it impossible for him to apply himself wholly to the production of intelligence material. He must, therefore, have as a Special Assistant a man who can examine all such material prior to its ultimate submission to him. This Special Assistant would presumably need the assistance of two competent helpers.

2. It is by no means contemplated that the duties and powers of the Special Assistant shall coincide with those presently exercised by the Intelligence Staff. It will also be noted that his function is closely associated not only with the Assistant Director but with the proposed Intelligence Planning Committee which shall be composed of the Branch Chiefs sitting under the chairmanship of the Assistant Director or his Deputy. The Special Assistant will sit on this committee as non-voting secretary, charged with the execution of such special

* Exception is made in the case of the Chief of the Current Division of the Intelligence Staff, who, despite the extreme difficulties of his position, has shown excellent editorial judgment.

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duties as may be assigned to him by it, in addition to his other duties as Special Assistant. The present plan also contemplates that Regional Chiefs shall in fact have final approval on all substantive changes in manuscripts submitted by them, but that the Special Assistant shall have the right in cases of disagreement to submit a "minority" report expressing his views, when the manuscript goes forward to the Assistant Director.

3. Special emphasis is placed on the Intelligence Planning Committee. In an overall, but highly important, sense its weekly meetings under the chairmanship of the Assistant Director will foster more intimate and productive relationships. This is most sorely needed on a formal as well as a personal basis. At the present time the Intelligence Staff has greatly embarrassed the Branch Chiefs in this connection. Moreover, the composite views of such a Committee will be more cohesive and powerful if expressed in formal meetings than if expressed individually by the Branch Chiefs. The Committee will, among other things, serve somewhat as a duly constituted town meeting in which the individuals are the responsible and authoritative heads of the producing units. Because of their direct knowledge of the inflow of intelligence, of the capacity of their staffs and personnel, as well as the problems confronting them in administrative ways, they alone are capable of formulating plans for intelligence production under the Assistant Director.

4. It should also be noted that this Committee by its very existence and chairmanship affords sound liaison and coordination between the office of the Assistant Director and lower echelons, and between the various Regional Branches. This condition does not exist at the present time.

5. The Special Assistant's duties will include the day to day execution of the program and policy laid down by the Committee, as it relates solely to the production of intelligence. It would be an error, in this connection, to define his duties too specific-

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Committee functions; much will also depend upon the type of man selected for this post, his abilities, qualities of cooperation, etc.


6. Those duties which reflect the Special Assistant's relationship to the Assistant Director as an intelligence producing expert consist, in a modified version, of the duties for which the Intelligence Staff appears intrinsically to have been conceived. That is to say that he will read all material furnished by the Branches from the viewpoint of the national security. This will require that he examine manuscripts first from the viewpoint of what they say, what they were intended to say, etc. Long experience has shown that the best of experts, even regarding an entire Branch as an expert, are liable from time to time, to focus their attention on their special projects at the expense of the larger picture. Then too, it is common experience, that the ability to express sometimes subtle shades of meaning does not always go hand in hand with the expert capacity to detect such meanings in the mass of intelligence material. Thus essential to the Special Assistant is the capacity for what painters call "innocence of eye". He is in theory the generalized ultimate reader of the Office of Reports and Estimates product and as such must be regarded (a) as a man who cannot be assumed to be cognizant of all the details with which the expert has dealt in reaching his conclusions and (b) unlike the expert, who is bent on detecting intelligence trends, he must apply such findings in a world sense. This dual function of the Special Assistant cannot be over-emphasized. He must have the viewpoint of an EXECUTIVE as distinguished from the pure SCHOLAR. In this he will make a clear and individual contribution to the work of the Office of Reports and Estimates since he will be isolated from the details of intelligence work, thus permitting him to examine all manuscripts from a clear and unprejudiced viewpoint. Since this quality is most desirable in the Office of Reports and Estimate reports, it is believed that his function is an essential one.

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7. The foregoing pages have made clear the fact that only a man who commands the respect of the producing members of the Office of Reports and Estimates staff can accomplish the mission of Special Assistant. The fact that he sits as a member of the Planning Committee will place him in a position vis a vis the Assistant Director and the Branch Chiefs which will build up direct, simple relationships. The Committee will come to feel that he is an organic component of its organization, despite the fact that he has no vote; with results quite opposite to the present Star Chamber type of activity carried on by the Chief of the Intelligence Staff and his associates.

8. The following chart is submitted in the belief that it affords the maximum relief from the present administrative difficulties of the Office of Reports and Estimates and with the confidence that, given the right personnel, it will produce maximum results both in quality and quantity of intelligence material produced.

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Composed of Branch Chiefs under the chairmanship of the Assistant Director. Meets weekly or oftener to plan intelligence production and coordination with Assistant Director and between Regional and Technical Branches.

1. Non voting secretary of Intelligence Planning Committee.
2. Carries out duties assigned by the Committee.
3. Provides general editorial supervision.

Produces Daily, Weekly, Monthly, etc., periodicals.
Cooperates on all non-periodical documents.

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